ind the effectiveness condition for this version of the U.S.–USSR brinkmanship game. Find

ind the effectiveness condition for this version of the U.S.–USSR brinkmanship game. Find

1. ind the effectiveness condition for this version of the U.S.–USSR brinkmanship game.
2. Find the acceptability condition for this game.
3. Graph the conditions you found in parts (a) and (b). (You can use graphing calculators. Here is an online one: www.desmos.com (Links to an external site.))
4. For what values of p, the probability that the Soviets are hard-line, is the pure threat (q = 1) acceptable? For what values of p is the pure threat unacceptable but brinkmanship still possible?
5. If Kennedy was correct in believing that p lay between 1/3 and 1/2, does your analysis of this version of the game suggest that an effective and acceptable probabilistic threat existed? Use this example to explain how a game theorist’s assumptions about player payoffs can have a major effect on the predictions that arise from the theoretical model.